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How (and when) INGV was born (Massimiliano Stucchi)

translated from https://terremotiegrandirischi.com/2019/09/26/come-e-quando-nacque-lingv-di-massimiliano-stucchi/ by googletranslate, revised

Premise. In spite of the fact that these days the twentieth anniversary of the birth of INGV is going to be celebrated, INGV was actually born on January 10th 2001. In 1999, Legislative Decree 381/1999 was published, which established the path and methods of establishing the INGV. Until January 10, 2001, INGV did not exist; in its place there existed the institutes that would have merged there later, with their presidents, directors and governing boards.
As one former colleague commented, celebrating the birth of INGV on the anniversary of his institutional decree, is a bit like “anticipating the birthday celebration to the day of conception ”(cit.). Anyhow.
I therefore thought I had some time to prepare a detailed account, perhaps with Tullio Pepe and others; this advance forces me to be a bit approximate, and I apologize to those who have lived through the experiences I describe if they will not find my narrative perfectly corresponding to how the events took place. However I liked writing it: comments are welcome and … I’ll fix it in 2021.

The year was 1998 and, as another ex-colleague reminded us, in Erice (Trapani), a high place of scientific research, a special course was held in July in the frame the “School of Geophysics”, directed by Enzo Boschi . In fact, mainly Italian researchers from research institutes in the geophysical, seismological and volcanological sector (ING, CNR, Vesuvian Observatory, Trieste Geophysical Observatory) met, as well as university professors from various disciplines related to geophysics. Some geological professors were also present.
If the Legislative Decree 381/1999 was the act of conception of the INGV, the Erice’s school was the phase of flirting, or even something more. The program saw broad-spectrum presentations on ongoing research and open problems, peacefully divided between researchers from all the bodies without exaggerated competition but, indeed, in a climate of collaboration; an absolute novelty for Italy. Until recently, in fact, and for many years, the institutions in question were openly conflicting both scientifically and operationally, also and above all to try to grab the limited public funds available.

From 1975 to 1981 the CNR’s Geodynamic Finalized Project (PFG), thanks to the open views of Paolo Gasparini (Naples), who was its first director, and of a high-level board of directors, had made seismologists and engineers, volcanologists and geologists actively collaborate in a “shaken” period – it must be said – from several important Italian earthquakes (Friuli, 1976, Gulf of Patti, 1978; Norcia, 1979; Irpinia-Basilicata, 1980), as well as from considerable earthquakes abroad. ING participated in a marginal way, only, both because of the short-sightedness of the leadership of that time, and by virtue of the fact that the institution was even at risk of being ruled by a commissioner, which then happened in 1981.
From the experience of the PFG the National Group for Volcanology (GNV) and the National Group for the Defense of Earthquakes (GNDT: the applicative purpose expressed by the title should be underlined) were born. In some respects the Great Risks Commission (CGR) was also born from PFG in 1982, based on the model of the French commission commissioned by Haroun Tazieff; Enzo Boschi was appointed Extraordinary Commissioner (and later director) of ING; subsequently, the State Secretary for Civil Protection was established. GNV and GNDT actually passed under the sponsorship of the Civil Protection Department, developed by Giuseppe Zamberletti (the PFG on the other hand emanated from Ministry of Research), emphasizing the applicative character of the research carried out by the two groups. The GNDT subsequently underwent various institutional changes.
ING did not participate in GNV and GNDT but to a minimum extent, for a high-level choice of address and allocation of funds: and this, beyond the good individual relations between the various researchers, contributed to fuel the above mentioned conflict.

The 1997 Colfiorito earthquakes (occurred when Franco Barberi was State Secretary for Civil Protection) determined, in addition to an impressive qualitative leap in scientific investigations and post-earthquake intervention, also a greater public attention to the problem of under-sizing resources and staff dedicated to the study of volcanoes and earthquakes. In addition to some interventions dedicated to ongoing situations (young researchers contracts), Enzo Boschi and Franco Barberi, with the help of the capable ING general director, began to study the possibility of a general reorganization of the sector (talks had begun time before, more quietly, at the end of the PFG I accompanied Franco Barberi to a meeting on the subject, in Enzo Boschi’s office at the University of Bologna). Boschi often remembered that other scientific sectors, perhaps less strategic for the life of the country than ours, such as the physics of nuclear particles, had acquired greater power, and therefore resources, precisely because they presented themselves united (after perhaps having washed their clothes dirty inside the family ….) and spoke with one voice, only.

Thus it was that in that school of Erice, after a couple of days of scientific presentations, Enzo Boschi opened a special session with some words that were then obscure to most. However, there was a perception that something big was happening and that we were attending a meeting of which we could say in the future “I was there too”. Boschi then gave the floor to Paolo Gasparini who illustrated the project in detail. Discussions took place on the spot and then “at home”; some quarrels, several perplexities: for example, for the “non-ING” regarding the fact of entering – model Germany East / DDR – in a sort of enlarged ING; for the “ING”, about the fear of having to bear some dead weight …
On September 29 of that year, the Legislative Decree 381/1999 was published, which established the perimeter of the reorganization, and the itinerary for the construction of the INGV. The ING, which merged into the INGV, was suppressed and the other selected Institutes also merged: Vesuvian Observatory and the three CNR Institutes: International Institute of Volcanology, Catania, Seismic Risk Research Institute, Milan and Institute of Geochemistry, Palermo, GNV, GNDT and “Poseidon System” (a sort of spin-off dedicated to Etna monitoring). The Experimental Geophysical Observatory of Trieste remained outside in its entirety (the “Friuli will do itself” model … ..), including the seismological section and the seismological network of Friuli. A Committee was drafted for the drafting of the Regulations which worked for about a year, through numerous internal meetings, consultations, etc. If I can bring a personal memory, I will say that in that difficult sequence of meetings I saw Boschi at its highest level ever, purposeful and determined.

On 10 January 2001, with the Regulations approved by the Ministry of Research, the Committee in question met for the last time, appointed the Directors of the Sections provided for in the Regulations (Milan, Naples, Catania, Palermo and three in Rome (plus Central Administration: new with respect to ING) and declared the INGV to be born. The position of director of the sections was entrusted, as per the Regulations, to INGV researchers. The next day the new directors began to concretely build the INGV sections. Pisa and Bologna were established a few years later, and a numerous branch offices were also established later.

The institutional Decree had left to  individual researchers the faculty to opt – at individual level and within a few weeks – to remain in the CNR, by virtue of some differences in the economic-juridical treatment that the Staff Regulation did not (or perhaps did not want) ) to unify. This option was used by some CNR researchers, and in particular by a substantial part of the permanent staff of the former Seismic Risk Research Institute (IRRS-CNR, Milan), which remained in the CNR and later joined other institutes. This was partly due to reasons of scientific disagreement, partly for reasons of lack of harmony with the future INGV and its leadership, despite a public “plea” addressed to them by Enzo Boschi during a reconnaissance visit to Milan.

The Decree also envisaged the possibility that INGV would establish sections at the University Faculties that would propose them, according to the model of the National Institute of Nuclear Physics (INFN). At the close of the terms, about twenty requests arrived. Some were not accepted because they came from faculties located in cities where an INGV section was already present, or in preparation. In these cases, the non-acceptance was followed by an invitation to establish collaborations at the local level. Others were not accepted as they were in fact requests for mere funding and not for sharing resources as well as objectives; those requests were impossible to accept in relation to the scarcity of available resources.
The collaboration with the universities – and with other subjects such as for example some Regions, the Eucentre Foundation (Pavia) and other institutions – was consolidated in any case through research projects, conventions, consortia, research doctorates, etc. In addition, it was strengthened through the GNV and the GNDT, later replaced by the INGV-DPC projects, in which INGV took charge of also managing the research contracts with the outside world.
On the other hand, a long phase in which the university world had substantially dominated, often relegating ING, CNR etc. researchers to the prevailing role of data collectors, came to an end. This was also an intuition of Enzo Boschi who, although he was a university professor himself, trusted a lot on the INGV researchers, who later repaid that trust with great amplitude.

Whether we celebrate the recurrence of the Decree or that of a real birth of INGV, it is striking to see that many of the main protagonists of the transition and the start of INGV – perhaps most of them – still on duty or retired, are not invited to the celebrations, even though many of them they are still top executives engaged in crucial activities for the life of the institution. Of other protagonists, first of all the tireless General Director Cesidio Lippa, who died in 2007, even the memory is not acknowledged. The same is true for the main promoter and first president of the ING, Enzo Boschi, who, on the other hand, remains alive in the memory of those who had the privilege of accompanying him on this adventure.

Do seismic hazard models kill? (Massimiliano Stucchi)

Introduction. The appearance of an article, on the weekly magazine L’Espresso (http://espresso.repubblica.it/plus/articoli/2019/08/26/news/terremoto-calcoli-sbagliati-1.338128?ref=HEF_RULLO&preview=true), which took advantage of the 2016 Amatrice earthquake anniversary to discredit the Italian seismic hazard model and the national building code based on it, using fake news and inconsistent arguments, made me angry.
What follows is a comment written for the benefit of the international readers.
The original version in Italian which can be found here (https://terremotiegrandirischi.com/2019/08/27/la-colpa-e-dei-modelli-di-pericolosita-sismica-di-massimiliano-stucchi/), which can easily be translated by means of the improved https://translate.google.com/.

As in many countries, since 2008 the Italian building code (NTC08 and now NTC18) makes reference to design spectra; they are taken from the results of the 2004 PSHA model (1). A new PSHA assessment is been published soon.

On the other hand, since a few years a very small group of Italian researchers proposes a so called alternative method for the evaluation of seismic hazard, based on the neo-deterministic approach. No problem, it is a current scientific discussion. Things became more complex when this group claims that their method should be taken as a basis for the building code; it becomes boorish when, like in the above mentioned article, they claim that the seismic actions proposed by the PSHA model, adopted by the building code, have been overcome in recent earthquakes, and that casualties are due to that “wrong” seismic actions, by making use of “fake news”.
Let’s see.

The article repeats, once again, the fake news that recorded PGA overcame the PGA estimated by the PSHA model, in the occasion of 2009 (L’Aquila) and 2012 (Emilia-Romagna) earthquakes. It has been proved that the above statement is not true (2) (3); simply, comparison are wrongly made between soft ground recordings and hard ground estimates!
In the case of the 2016 Amatrice and Norcia earthquakes, yes, recorded PGA did overcome PSHA estimated PGA. Does it mean that the model did underestimate?

It must first be considered that estimated PGA comes with some % probability of being exceeded in xx years (the most common figures being 10% and 50 years). Moreover, the comparison should be made (if really needed) on the whole design spectrum, not on PGA which is not used for building design; but such comparisons are not recommendable (4). Finally,  the main point is that the PSHA model is a model; it offers various elaborations related to different probabilities of exceedance in different time-intervals. For example, some peak values recorded in 2016 are slightly higher than those related to the 2% probability of exceeding in 50 years, but are lower than those related to the 1% probability of exceeding in the same interval.

So the matter comes back to the main point: do we need to design against the maximum expected shaking (and how to assess it?), or to a shaking with a lower probability of exceedance with respect to the adopted one which, by the way, is adopted in many countries of the world?

This is not a seismological – nor a SHA – problem. SHA models offer a variety of possible solutions and then someone decides. It is a political decision which, usually, is in fact taken by engineers (cost-benefits analysis); unfortunately, this often happens without or with little explanation. We know for instance that source of the “475 return period” is close to casual, but it seems to represent a “satisfactory” compromise. Would be nice if it was explained better, however, so to allow that part of the public, which is not ready to follow scandal claims, to understand by itself.

Are the detractors of the PSHA model and the building code able to provide one example, only one, of a building, designed according the NTC08 without executions mistakes, which collapsed because the design spectra values were overcome by the recorded ones? It would be a good, practical case history, instead of a theoretical clash. This question was already asked for, without getting an answer.
And, even more important: why to give the wrong idea to the public that, as soon as design spectra are exceeded, buildings collapse?

The article, and the scientists behind, quotes the reconstruction of Norcia after the 1979 earthquake and the San Benedetto Basilica (which did stood it); both have little to do with NTC08 and related design spectra. The worst, however, comes with the reference to the collapse of the school in San Giuliano di Puglia (2002), “renovated according to inadequate criteria”. Shame on you, who mix this event with your crusade against PSHA and NTC08! That school was restored in the absence – at that time – of the building code (responsibility of the Ministries which delayed the expansion of the building code to all Italy with all their power), and according to a questionable design.

Seismic hazard models do not kill; buildings do, with the help of fake news!

The forgotten vulnerability (interview with Gianluca Valensise)


Gianluca Valensise, of the Earthquake Department of INGV, Rome, is a seismologist with a geological background, an INGV research manager, and the author of numerous studies on active faults in Italy and other countries. In particular he is the “founder” of Italy’s Database of Individual Seismogenic Sources (DISS, http://diss.rm.ingv.it/diss/). He has spent over 30 years of his career exploring the relationships between active tectonics and historical seismicity, with the goal of merging geological observations with the available evidence on the largest earthquakes of the past.
Recently, with other colleagues, he published a work that proposes a sort of vulnerability ranking of Apennines municipalities. We discuss it below.

Luca, you are an earthquake geologist. You deal with active faults, seismogenic sources, past earthquakes, seismic hazard. Recently, with other colleagues, you have ventured into the theme of seismic vulnerability of the Italian building heritage. How come this choice?

First of all let me recall that I am a researcher, but also a citizen who is in a position to be able – and having to – to do something immediately useful for his own country.
That said, I believe that it all started ten years ago, following the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake. That the extreme vulnerability of the built-up area was one of the causes of the disastrous results of some earthquakes had already become clear to me from before, if only for having studied the effects of the strongest Italian earthquakes of the ‘900; from that of 1908 in the Strait of Messina to that of Irpinia in 1980, passing through the area of Fucino, devastated by the earthquake of 1915.

But the story actually begins even earlier, with the earthquake of San Giuliano di Puglia in 2002. That earthquake showed everyone that some of the choices made in the defense – or lack of defense – from earthquakes can be so disastrous as to frustrate both the material culture accumulated by those who live in the seismic zones, both the technological advancements in the construction industry: these advancements concern not only reinforced concrete structures, but also those built with load-bearing masonry.
The 2009 L’Aquila earthquake showed almost a complete reversal of the “normal” situation: excluding cultural assets, for which other rules apply, the maximum number of collapses and victims was recorded in post-WWII buildings, while those of previous eras – including the eighteenth-century buildings of the historic city – overall responded quite satisfactorily (this different performance also includes the choice of the site, sometimes disastrous in the case of some recent buildings).

There is little to add on the case of the May 2012 earthquakes in Emilia. The damage was dominated by the collapses in ecclesiastical architecture – to a large extent inevitable – and in the industrial one, which instead represented a bolt from the blue for everyone. I would like to remind you that the collapsed warehouses had been built without considering the possibility of significant lateral seismic actions, which have therefore played a major role in causing collapses that are apparently disproportionate to the severity of the earthquake itself. The previous antiseismic code did not require buildings in that area to be earthquake-proof: nevertheless, this remains a tragedy in the tragedy, if we reflect on the enormous disproportion between how little it would have costed to substantially reduce the vulnerability of those industrial premises (provided, however, that the reinforcements had been planned ahead of construction), and the price paid by those communities in terms of human lives and damage to the local (and national) economy.
Finally, there is the case of the 2016, Central Italy earthquakes, and of the dualism between the historical center of Amatrice, that practically disappeared from the map, and that of Norcia, that has entered a path of rebirth, although this path is fraught with many difficulties. This dualism has spurred our research (1, 2).

The basic thesis that you support is that – perhaps I simplify – the seismic vulnerability of settlements increases with the temporal distance from the last destructive earthquake. In a sense, you argue, after a destructive earthquake, repairs and reconstructions are carried out which reduce the overall vulnerability; then the memory of the event fades out and the vulnerability increases. Is this so?

The thesis in extreme synthesis is the one you have outlined, but I must make two premises. The first concerns the data used: in order to rely on homogeneous and good quality data, we have chosen to analyze only peninsular Italy, and in particular the Apennines chain. The second one has instead a methodological character: in our work we use jointly the historical observations, in the form of the seismic history of each single municipality, and the geological observations, which within a vast territory allow us to isolate those municipalities that are directly located above the great seismogenic sources. As such these municipalities will experience strong ground shaking, sooner or later (see the image below). It should be noted that the historical data would in many cases allow to go even below the municipal scale, but in order to grant a homogeneous representation and to be able to relate to the ISTAT data we have decided to bring everything back to the single municipality.

Figure 1 CFTI-DISS_200

Composite Seismogenic Sources taken from the DISS database (DISS Working Group, 2018: http://diss.rm.ingv.it/diss/) and the strongest earthquakes (Mw 5.8 and larger) in the CFTI5Med catalog (Catalog of Strong Earthquakes in Italy, Guidoboni et al., 2018). Each source represents the surface projection of the fault at seismogenic depth. The sources in yellow outline the system of large extensional faults running along the crest of the Apennines and have been used for this research. Each source is surrounded by a 5 km buffer whose role is to take into account the uncertainties inherent in its exact location, and therefore its exact distance from the inhabited centers that surround it or lie above it (from Valensise et al., 2017: see Note 1).

It is from the municipalities so selected (see the figure above) – 716 for the whole of central and southern Italy, from Tuscany to Calabria – that we then ranked the attitude of each community to underestimate the level of local danger, and therefore to fatally lower the guard on the issue of building vulnerability. It would have been useless to consider all municipalities, including those that lie far from the large seismogenic sources, because one thing is a dilapidated building in a scarcely seismic area, such as most of the Tyrrhenian side of the Apennines, another is if that same building is located in Amatrice. We wanted to elaborate a “ranking” of the vulnerability forgotten by citizens and their administrators, and we have put in place the best geological, geodynamic and historical knowledge available today – an almost unique heritage in the world – to achieve this goal. One last observation: the data we used are frozen at pre-2016, so our ranking does not take into account the latest earthquakes in the central Apennines.

In this way you have drawn up a sort of seismic vulnerability ranking of the Apennine settlements, based essentially on the temporal distance from the last destructive event. Can you illustrate this ranking a little?

We have ordered our 716 locations (see figure below) as a function of distance over time since the last VIII intensity shaking (Mercalli-Cancani-Sieberg or MCS scale:): a level of intensity that we believe marks a boundary between the simple repair of old buildings and the need to demolish and rebuild them from scratch, with a presumably drastic reduction in vulnerability.

Figure 2 Mappa ranking_200

Distribution of the 716 municipalities (representative of the entire municipal areas) selected with the procedure described in the text (from Valensise et al., 2017). The areas outlined in yellow represent the surface projection of the large seismogenic sources that run along the crest of the Apennines. The map shows:
– in purple: 38 municipalities for which historical sources report only minor damage;
– in red: 315 municipalities that in our ranking correspond to the municipal areas that have not suffered destructive earthquakes since 1861 (the year of unification of Italy);
– in black: 363 municipalities ordered according to the distance in time from the latest destructive earthquake, which occurred after 1861.
The reference to 1861 is purely conventional. The year 1861 represents a historical watershed that is also essential for earthquakes, with variable effects on a case-by-case basis (just think of the very effective Bourbon seismic regulations, that were abolished following the Unity of Italy).

The first 38 localities are those that have never experienced a shaking of the set level: following are those where that level was reached or exceeded many centuries ago, while in the end we find the places that have suffered for the most recent earthquakes, and therefore have been presumably reconstructed with anti-seismic systems.
Our elaborations are easily accessible to anyone through a dedicated website, which shows our ranking both in table and on map, and allows to explore the seismic history of each municipality (3). The only other parameters we show, without using them for the moment, are the resident population and the percentage of pre-1918 buildings, both from ISTAT data.

To illustrate the implications of our study I will give examples taken from the ranking itself. A striking case is that of the Mid-Serchio Valley, with several localities in the highest part of the ranking, that collects the municipalities that have never experienced a VIII degree in history: going from NW to SE we find Gallicano (193°), Coreglia Antelminelli (192 °), Borgo a Mozzano (31°), at Bagni di Lucca (32 °), all centers around 4,000 to 6,000 inhabitants, all in the province of Lucca. Only Barga , the pleasant mountain village celebrated by Giovanni Pascoli that is also the main center of the area, is presumably safe (595°).

It is easy to see that the position in the ranking goes up – thus worsening – moving towards the SE, i.e. moving away from the source of the 1920 earthquake in Garfagnana, also known as upper Serchio Valley. There is no doubt that the two portions of the valley are similar, but the seismotectonic data suggests that while the northern part suffered its “great” earthquake less than a century ago, the fault beneath the southern part is historically silent. According to the CFTI5Med catalogue, in 1920 Barga suffered a VIII degree, and the earthquake “… damaged 75% of the buildings, mostly inhabited by a poor population, causing the total collapse of many houses …”. Will this reconstruction suffice to save Barga from the next strong earthquake in the Serchio Valley? Things will probably be better than in the most downstream municipalities, also because, if it is true that according to ISTAT, 37% of Barga’s housing stock is pre-1918, i.e. more than a century old, this share of buildings is probably made up of houses that resisted the 1920 earthquake: either because they were built better, or because they were built where the seismic response was less severe than the average, or because of a combination of these two circumstances.

Another example I would like to take concerns the Calabrian-Lucanian border, between the provinces of Potenza and Cosenza in southern Italy. The case is similar to the previous one, but definitely more evident. We are in fact in one of the few portions of the Apennines chain that have never suffered a strong earthquake in historical times, even if the completeness of the seismic record of the area does not exceed a few centuries (with Emanuela Guidoboni in 2000 we wrote a small contribution precisely on this theme: see Note 4). The area had already been identified as a possible “seismic gap” by Japanese seismologist Fusakichi Omori within a study he conducted on the largest earthquakes of the Italian peninsula. In the area in question lie Mormanno (Cosenza, 29°) and Rotonda (Potenza, 30 °), never affected by a strong earthquake, but also Viggianello (Potenza, 178°), hit by a VIII-IX degree in the earthquake of January 26 1708 – which according to the CFTI5Med catalogue “… seriously damaged the village causing extensive destruction and numerous victims …”. On 25 October 2012 this area was hit by an earthquake with Mw 5.3, which tested the solidity of the buildings but above all it spurred a vast effort for the reduction of building vulnerability: a very local circumstance, linked to the occurrence of an earthquake that is not destructive but sufficient to trigger a solid reaction from the institutions, and that could be a welcome exception to what would be expected based on our ranking.

The list of locations where the “seismic memory” has been well cultivated certainly includes many other centers, especially in central and southern Italy: but the effectiveness of these virtuous behaviors will receive confirmation only from the forthcoming earthquakes.

The case of Norcia seems quite special. The famous building regulations enforced by the Papal State (1859) seem to have contributed since then to limit the damage, even in the case of the 1979 earthquake. Viceversa, for mysterious reasons Norcia was included in the seismic code only in 1962. In 2016 it suffered more damage outside the walls than inside. Do you have an opinion on this?

Norcia is ranked 676° place in our classification, mainly by virtue of the 1979 earthquake, but had previously suffered intensity VIII or larger effects in 1730, 1859 and 1879.
The case of Norcia is indeed quite unique. The “fortune” of Norcia towards earthquakes – if the term is granted to me, being perhaps inappropriate in view of what has happened in the city over the past few months (5) – is largely due to two symbolic earthquakes, those of 1859 and 1979, both with a magnitude of around 5.8, and to a sort of wake-up earthquake, that of 1997. Let me explain it better.

Following the 1859 earthquake the prelate Arcangelo Secchi and the architect Luigi Poletti prepared a very accurate analysis of what had happened, accompanied by recommendations on the reconstruction collected in the famous “Building Regulations” approved between the end of 1859 and the spring of 1860. It for this reason that the 1979 earthquake found a building patrimony that on average was substantially more hard-wearing than that of the surrounding towns, although the lesson imparted by the earthquake of 120 years before had perhaps already been partly lost. After 1979 Norcia was rebuilt with a great commitment, both by residents and institutions. The 1997earthquake, whose epicenter was quite far from Norcia, was the occasion for a “recall” of what had been done after 1979, as it is done with vaccines. The nursini – the people of Norcia – have the earthquake in their DNA: and I state this with full knowledge of the facts because some of my maternal cousins were born and raised there.

I believe that Secchi and Poletti’s famous Building Regulations did play a major role; an example for all, that of the Civic Tower, which miraculously survived the 30 October 2016 earthquake. Norcia demonstrates that the lesson taught by history to the local culture may compensate for any delays in the introduction and implementation of anti-seismic codes. In Norcia the local culture has not waited for modern codes but has anticipated them, also thanks to Secchi and Poletti. We should also remember that in Italy the codes have always only affected only new buildings and those that have been significantly restored; nothing is imposed to the owners of existing buildings. In my opinion this is one of the great unresolved issues, perhaps the greatest, as well as a source of misunderstandings and ill-fated expectations.

If we want, the case you mention – that of greater damage outside the walls of Norcia compared to the historic center s.s. – is a paradoxical confirmation of the role of “historical memory” in mitigating the effects of earthquakes. Here, too, an engineer should speak in my place, but I will try to venture hypotheses, some of them quite obvious.

First of all it must be said that the value of the “historical memory” of the nursini applies only to the “historical component” of the building stock. This statements seems redundant, but in fact what could be the value of “historical memory” for a condominium built in the 1980s, very different from the constructive style of the city center but rather similar to what you see in many urban suburbs of Italy?
The construction style is also the basis of my second hypothesis, stemming from the evidence that a load-bearing masonry building can also defend itself very well from earthquakes, provided that it is well built or renovated, according to the best practices in use in the various epochs. Recall that the 30 October shock was a Mw 6.5 earthquake located just below the center of Norcia: the accelerations observed were very significant, to the point of making the performance of masonry buildings truly extraordinary. In condominiums built outside the walls, instead – but I insist that this is the opinion of a geologist – once again we have seen that in normal reinforced concrete buildings the performance of the supporting structure can also be very different from that of of infills and of any accessory structures. This means that the building is unlikely to collapse, unless there are evident flaws in its design, but also that non-structural damage can be so burdensome as to make it convenient to demolish and rebuild: a paradox which I believe has been addressed in the new Norme Tecniche sulle Costruzioni 2018 (Technical Standards for Construction, or NTC18), at least for the future.

Have you had the chance to discuss this study with some seismic engineer, or have you received any reaction from that environment? How do you think your results can be used, and above all by whom?

We have received words of encouragement both from various engineers to whom we have submitted the first version of the manuscript, and from the public to whom we have presented the study in the most diverse occasions. But that’s all, because there have not been other reactions, at least for now – and I refer above all to those of the institutions. We also tried to establish a relationship with the Casa Italia Mission Structure, when it was still directed by Prof. Azzone, but also in this case there was no reaction. Evidently Casa Italia does not share with us the need to set priority criteria for risk mitigation interventions soon: interventions that the Structure is not implementing anyway, if not in the ten symbol-building sites that will be opened in as many symbol cities.

We believe that earthquake mitigation must combine excellent scientific assumptions – and in Italy we believe we have both a rich heritage of seismicity data, and an excellent expertise to make the best use of them – with much pragmatism as regards how and where invest any resources that may become available for seismic improvement. We also believe that the Sisma Bonus (“Seismic Bonus”) could be a useful tool, but only on condition that the criteria for assigning its benefits are drastically reviewed (and that the Sisma Bonus is made overall more “attractive”, by reviewing the delivery mechanisms: but on this I leave the floor to the experts of financial things). In particular, we maintain that a ranking of priorities must be drawn up between the various municipalities and the various aggregates of buildings, choosing them on the basis of their presumable vulnerability – on the basis of hypotheses such as those formulated by us – or real – on the basis of punctual findings, even if expeditious.

Launching this process harmoniously requires a solid control room, which I believe should include researchers, representatives of the professional associations involved, ISTAT officials, as well as institutional representatives of various origins (the Italian Civil Protection, the Ministry of Economic Development or MiSE, the National Association of Italian Municipalities etc.). For over two years I thought and hoped that this control room could coincide with the structures of Casa Italia, but today it is clear to me that I was wrong.

Finally – last but not least – it is necessary to launch a multi-year approach to the mitigation of seismic risk; an approach which at least on such an important issue breaks down the endemic “five years perspective” (when it’s good) that from always characterizes the governments of the Belpaese. But the ability to effectively plan the future is not one of the traditional virtues of the Italians, and therefore I fear we will not go very far on this side.

As a researcher I can clearly distinguish what makes sense from what could only be written in a book of dreams. However – and with this I close the circle you opened with the first question – I would like to dedicate the next few years to promote a change of course on how these issues are coped with in Italy today. I consider it a moral duty of my generation of seismologists; a generation stemming from the immense – and certainly avoidable – catastrophes of Friuli and Irpinia, and from the subsequent birth of a modern and effective Civil Protection.

(1) https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212420917302376?via%3Dihub

(2) http://www.cngeologi.it/2018/08/27/geologia-tecnica-ambientale-7/

(3) http://storing.ingv.it/cfti/cftilab/forgotten_vulnerability/#

(4) https://www.annalsofgeophysics.eu/index.php/annals/article/view/3672

(5) http://www.ansa.it/umbria/notizie/2019/04/19/continua-protesta-comitato-norcia_584b1669-91d1-4654-9563-504bdc31f3ba.html

L’Aquila, 31 March 2009: ten years ago (Massimiliano Stucchi)

Translated by google translate, reviewed

On March 31, 2009, an earthquake expert meeting convened by the Head of Civil Protection, G. Bertolaso, took place in L’Aquila; the consequences of it were the subject of countless discussions, articles, volumes, and a famous trial.
It is not my intention to take up those arguments, which still see a flourishing of interventions, as always not completely updated.
I just want to remember how it came to that meeting.

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Earthquake risk education: a partial statement for Italy (interview with Romano Camassi)

Translated by Google Translate, revised

Romano Camassi is a researcher at INGV (Department of Bologna). ‘Seismologist’ of eccentric training (a degree in Pedagogy, a thesis in modern history), engaged for more than three decades in historical research on earthquakes. Co-author of the main catalogues of Italian earthquakes. For over 15 years he has dedicated a part of his work to seismic risk education projects.

After every destructive earthquake, in Italy as elsewhere, the need to improve the earthquake education the seismic risk education, or even to introduce it at various levels, is recalled. It is true that, albeit not generally, there have been and there are several initiatives in this area. Can you give us an idea, and maybe refer to some publication that summarizes them?
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Crying wolf? take care with earthquake alarms…..(Massimiliano Stucchi)


translated by Google Translate, revised

Introduction. In this post we comment – among other things – scientific models and their possible application for civil protection purposes. The discussion is necessarily simplified: a more detailed post is under consideration.

1. The deterministic earthquake prediction has always been invoked by humanity as a possible shelter from seismic disasters, in particular for what concerns the possibility of remaining victims. For science, on the other hand, it is a distant and perhaps unattainable goal, which requires theoretical knowledge and experimental observations on the dynamics of energy accumulation and release, which are not available today. The theme is broad and complex and cannot be treated at depth in these pages. Continua a leggere →

August notes, with another trial at L’Aquila
 (Massimiliano Stucchi)

translated by Google, revised

Since at least a couple years  August gives us death and damage: Amatrice in 2016, Ischia in 2017, this year the highways, the Pollino flood and a seismic sequence (Molise) that so far has produced only minor damage. And other news that is worth commenting on.

On the Morandi bridge in Genoa everything and even more was said. There is little to add, if not the reflection that bridges of that type, and also of another type, are vulnerable both to wear and possible external impacts (airplanes, drones, attacks, etc.). These bridges are designed to withstand a given external event that is never the maximum possible, also because in these cases this maximum is not known. So, like many things, they keep a level of risk. To be know. Continua a leggere →

Towards the new seismic hazard model of Italy (interview with Carlo Meletti)


In 2004 a small research group, coordinated by INGV, released the Map of Seismic hazard of the Italian territory (MPS04), compiled as required by the Ordinance n. 3274 of the President of the Council of Ministers (2003). The map was to serve as a reference for the Regions, whose task is to update the seismic classification of the respective territories. The map was then made “official” by the Ordinance n. 3519 of the President of the Council of Ministers (28 April 2006) and subsequently published on  the Official Gazette (No. 108 of 11 May 2006).
In the following, other elaborations were added to the map using the same conceptual structure. It  represents the first modern seismic hazard model for Italy. For the first time estimates for different return periods and for various spectral accelerations were released. This model has been then used as the basis for the building code contained in the 2008 Technical Regulations (NTC08), which became operational in 2008 and was also adopted by the 2018 Technical Regulations.
Features and events related to the success of MPS04 are described, among other things, in two posts of this blog:

Che cos’è la mappa di pericolosità sismica? Prima parte (di Massimiliano Stucchi)

La mappa di pericolosità sismica (parte seconda); usi, abusi, fraintendimenti (di Massimiliano Stucchi)

As usual in many seismic countries, since a few years a research group is compiling a new hazard model, which uses updated data and techniques.
Massimiliano Stucchi discusses about it with Carlo Meletti who, after its important contribution to MPS04, coordinates the new initiative through the INGV Seismic Hazard Center.

MPS04,  even if compiled  “in a hurry” in order to meet the State requirements, had a considerable success, both in the technical-administrative field and – after a few years – at the public level. What drives a new model to be built?

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